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ABSTRACT 
Studies of transnational political activism or Diaspora politics have 
tended to disregard the importance of political gatekeepers in the 
pursuit of immigrants’ and refugees’ political change back home 
Furthermore, when attention has been given to the crucial role of 
gatekeepers for politically engaged migrants to negotiate their ways into 
host-country politics, it has often been confined just to resumes of those 
involved and the activities undertaken. Rarely has research engaged 
with questioning political gatekeepers themselves about their personal 
beliefs underlying their commitments to the cause. Nor has research 
often looked into how certain alignments and cooperative relationships 
between transnational political actors and their gatekeepers in receiving 
countries came into being, and how such genealogies might lend insight 
into the transnational advocacy networks and the particular types of 
activities that transnational political actors have developed. This paper 
aims to help fill this lacuna, by providing original and unique insights 
into the genealogy of Flemish nationalists’ support for Turkey’s Kurdish 
nationalist movement, and thus also to testify to how investigations into 
political gatekeepers can improve our understanding of the ways in 
which transnationalism materializes.  
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Introduction 
Diasporas influence international images, focus attention on issues of identity, and are 
able to affect foreign policy decision making (Barth & Shain, 2003). Diaspora political 
elites are often strongly engaged with the political situation of the homeland, for which 
access to political gatekeepers is a sine qua non. Political gatekeepers are defined here 
as individuals and collective bodies (political parties, labor unions, NGOs) inside 
receiving states that enable those active in the pursuit of homeland political change to 
access the political terrains where they might affect the receiving countries’ policies 
towards the homeland. Gatekeepers’ roles should not be underestimated, as they not 
only enable access to the host-societies’ political power structures, but also help to 
shape the collective organization of migrants and refugees by providing organizational 
models and related resources (Soysal 1994).  
Despite the manifest importance of political gatekeepers, however, studies of 
transnational political activism have often disregarded their role in the pursuit of 
political change back home. When attention has been devoted to the gatekeepers, it has 
generally remained confined either to listings of the actors involved and the types of 
activities undertaken (Emanuelsson, 2005; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Grojean, 2008) or 
to more abstract generalizations about the assumed significance of the relations 
between the integration policies and citizenship regimes of the receiving states and the 
absence or presence of homeland political activism (Nell, 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). 
Although there has been some interesting research done from an agency-oriented 
perspective that treats as more meaningful the concrete transnational practices in 
respect of transnationalism’s how (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; 2003a & 2003b), this 
research did not provide satisfactory explanations as to why certain political 
gatekeepers support the demands and efforts of transnational political activists.  
Of course it could be argued that host-country politicians as political gatekeepers may 
have the electoral support they can obtain by addressing the concerns of certain (ethnic) 
constituents as their primary incentive. This consideration cannot apply, however, in 
cases with small and electorally insignificant ethnic minorities. This makes the case at 
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hand, that of the Kurds in Belgium, which makes it all the more interesting, since the 
Kurds in Belgium number only an estimated 40,000 (of which less than half live in the 
Flemish speaking North of the country, the focus of this paper). Representing around a 
half of one percent of the total electorate, therefore, these citizens of Kurdish descent 
play no significant role in the electoral strategies of the country’s political parties. On the 
contrary, almost all the politicians interviewed in the research presented here testified 
that their political engagements for the plight of the Kurds have never been politically 
rewarded, either by Kurdish or by Belgian voters. Kurdish transnational political actors 
have been able to translate their demands into Flemish politics, that is, despite their lack 
of electoral value.  
Of concern here are those gatekeepers that are addressed through lobbying. Lobby work 
involves forms of transnational political practices and indirect homeland politics with 
which transnational active migrants and refugees work (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). 
With regards to the lobby work of transnational political actors, Østergaard-Nielsen was 
one of the first to investigate how some groups manage to negotiate their way into the 
host-country political establishment when others remain outside of it (2003b). Her 
research, nevertheless, still focused primarily on the agents of transnational political 
activism, that is the Diaspora elites (providing insight into their strengths and 
weaknesses), and only secondarily on the importance of gatekeepers. More thorough 
investigations into the host-country political gatekeepers’ relations with transnational 
political actors have increased our understanding of ‘negotiating ways in’ (Østergaard-
Nielsen, 2003b). This type of inquiry attests to the importance of the personal as well as 
ideological beliefs of gatekeepers and their organizational embeddedness – but it can do 
more than that.  Interesting but often overlooked are the particular ways in which 
alignments and cooperative relationships between transnational political actors and 
their host-country gatekeepers come into being. These so-called ‘organizational 
genealogies’ tell us more about the particularities of the transnational political practices 
employed by specific groups and how they develop. These genealogies of cooperation 
reveal that exchanges between local political gatekeepers and transnational political 
activists are learning processes that generate specific types of initiatives, and they 
improve our understanding of the particular transnational advocacy networks that come 
into being through transnational activism. Clearly there is thus something to be gained 
from a more in-depth inquiry of political gatekeepers. Until now, research has rarely 
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engaged directly with the personal beliefs, viewpoints and experiences of political 
mediators that underlie their commitments to what are ultimately ‘other people’s 
causes’. This is in contrast to the increasing volume of research inquiring into the variety 
of reasons for the ongoing commitments of immigrants and (political) refugees to their 
country of origin (Alinia, 2005; Argun, 2003; Westwood & Phizacklea, 2000). That the 
neglected middle men of political gatekeeping deserve more attention in studies of 
transnationalism is  precisely what this paper intends to demonstrate, by means of an 
inquiry into the genealogy of Belgium’s Flemish nationalists’ support for and 
organizational cooperation with Turkey’s Kurdish nationalist movement.   
The outline of the paper is as follows. To begin with, brief sketches are made of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey and the Flemish nationalist movement in 
Belgium, depicting their main political actors, ideas and goals. Thereafter, the paper 
engages with a narration of the latter’s interest in and involvement with the 
transnational political activism of (Turkish) Kurds in Europe. Particular attention will be 
devoted to the genealogy of the support for the plight of the Kurds as a ‘people’ as 
narrated by political personalities who have been key figures in the creation of a 
political space for discussion of Turkey’s Kurdish question in Belgian and also European 
politics.  
The material for this paper was gathered through semi-structured interviews with 
(former) Flemish politicians who have long been involved with Turkey’s Kurdish 
question as well as through additional archival research both into political initiatives in 
the Belgian and European Parliaments, and at the Kurdish Institute of Brussels. All 
quotations are from the author’s personal communication with the individuals 
concerned, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
Turkey’s Kurdish nationalist movement 
The origins of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey date back to the beginning of 
the 20th century and the establishment of the modern Turkish nation-state in the 1920s 
(see Taspinar, 2005; McDowall, 1996). The nationalist-secularist republic fashioned 
from the rump Ottoman Empire was immediately faced with a legitimacy crisis in its 
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Kurdish inhabited region, which tended to be more conservative (religious), had a long 
history of quasi-autonomy and nationalist aspirations of its own. Indeed, plans for an 
Anatolian Kurdistan in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres dealing with the Allied dissolution of 
the Empire were only abandoned when the treaty was annulled following the success of 
the Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). The 1920s and 1930s saw 
several Kurdish rebellions in the southeast of Turkey, which were all crushed, ushering 
in a period of severe military repression with deportations and resettlement as the 
region fell under direct rule from Ankara and martial law (Taspinar, 2005). Meanwhile, 
the new republic’s instalment of the Turkish language and introduction of systems of 
national education and military service served as instruments for the ‘Turkification’ 
(assimilation) of its Kurdish inhabitants.  
From the 1950s onwards, the Kurdish question in Turkey was perceived in terms of 
‘backward social forces’ that were ‘rebelling against a modern state power that 
promised progress and prosperity’, and thus regarded in terms of a ‘resistance of the 
past against the present’. This rejection of ‘modern state power that promised progress 
and prosperity’ would thus be debated as a problem of regional underdevelopment, with 
the solution consequently seen to lie in economical integration (Yeğen, 2011:69). The 
ethnic dimension denied, Turkish officials sought to prevent any collective public 
expression of Kurdishness, which led eventually even to a denial of the very existence of 
Kurds as a separate ethnic entity (Watts, 2006; Barkey & Fuller, 1998).  With the public 
use of the Kurdish language of the majority of Turkey’s Kurds, Kurmanji, seriously 
confined, even the standardization of the language was developed mainly by Kurdish 
intellectuals living in exile in Europe (Kreyenbroek, 1991).  
It took until the end of the 1960s for Kurds to organize themselves again. In the ‘Eastern 
Meetings’, assembled leftist and Kurdish political activists sought to expose and explain 
the economic backwardness of the Kurdish southeast. The organization of Kurdish 
political formations grew especially from dissident involvement in the revolutionary 
Left of Turkey during the 1970s, from which originated the 1978 founded Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011). The maintenance of the feudal 
system due to the collaboration of (Kurdish) landlords with the central state in return 
for block votes was regarded as a major factor holding the region back.  
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The successive military coups of 1971 and 1980 had a devastating effect on these 
political formations and their militants, many of whom were imprisoned, killed or fled to 
Europe. The PKK, however, had relocated to neighbouring Syria, leaving it one of the few 
leftist or Kurdish organizations to survive the 1980 coup. Consequently, it was able to 
reorganize inside Turkey and build a support basis there for the armed struggle it 
regarded as the only way to achieve political and socio-economical change in the 
Kurdish southeast, as well as in the country as a whole (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011).  
In 1984, the PKK instigated an armed insurgency against the Turkish state, which 
responded by placing the Kurdish inhabited provinces of Turkey under the rule of a 
state of emergency law, equivalent in some parts of the Southeast to military occupation. 
Systemic human rights violations during this period extended, for example, to regular 
extra-judicial killings. Nevertheless, the PKK insurgency proved successful as the 
guerrilla force took effective control of large tracts of land, forcing the state to respond 
with a new counter-insurgency strategy. This included the establishment of a state-
armed local militia system (‘village guards’) combined with a cleansing of the 
countryside that involved the wholesale eviction of a million people, perhaps more 
(Jongerden, 2007).  
From the early days of the war, a great number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and others seeking safety and ways to sustain their livelihoods escaped to the big 
Kurdish cities and migrated to the western Turkish metropolises. Many went to Europe, 
including political asylum seekers. This induced an acceleration of the urbanization and 
internationalization of the Kurdish population, which in turn contributed to an increase 
in Kurdish political activism and the emergence of a Kurdish civil society and public 
sphere (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011; Watts, 2006; Gambetti, 2008). By the beginning of 
the 1990s, the PKK had become a mass movement (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011; Romano, 
2006), enjoying popular and growing support among Kurds in Turkey and Europe, 
where it became the main political player overseeing a significant number of 
associations (Grojean, 2008). The PKK thus became the primary reference point for 
Kurdish national activism, offering a new, alternative set of national symbols to those of 
the Turkish state (Bozarslan, 2000).   
From 1990 onwards, Kurdish political activists sought parliamentary political 
representation in Turkey through their own political party, the People’s Labour Party 
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(HEP). Construed as a threat to the national integrity of the country, however, the HEP 
and successive pro-Kurdish parties were allowed to function only for short periods of 
time until being closed down. Although these parties failed to pass the nationwide ten 
percent threshold necessary for representation in the Ankara parliament, they did 
provide the Kurdish nationalist movement with a new set of public advocates. Legal 
political activism was extremely dangerous, however, with high risks for those involved 
of imprisonment, torture or death – for example, over a hundred members of the pro-
Kurdish parties were murdered between 1991 and 2001 (Watts, 2006).  
By the end of the 1990s, the Kurdish parties were increasingly winning office in 
municipal elections, but the PKK had suffered serious military setbacks in the face of the 
tough counter-insurgency measures undertaken by the Turkish state, ultimately leading 
to the capture of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the consequent withdrawal of most of 
its guerilla units across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan territory. The PKK declared a 
unilateral ceasefire in 1999, which has held (with breaks) since, resulting in a sharp 
decrease of the number of casualties and an end to the environment of insecurity. This 
was reinforced during the early 2000s by a number of liberalizing reforms undertaken 
in order for Turkey to be accepted as candidate for EU membership.  
With the positive political developments in the 2000s, Kurdish nationalists generally 
were most concerned to establish the political legitimacy of their demands, which 
include finding a way to settle the armed conflict and allow the political integration of 
the PKK (Casier, 2010b). Indeed, and despite apparently fatal blows – including being 
listed by the EU (and US) as an international terrorist organization with the ‘War on 
Terror’ in the wake of 9/11 – the PKK did manage to maintain a significant influence in 
Kurdish civil society.  
Having long foregone the initial (PKK) aim of complete independence, the Kurdish 
nationalist movement has continued to seek recognition of the Kurdish nation in the 
Turkish constitution, to strive for Kurdish cultural rights and increased political 
autonomy in the Southeast. Kurdish activists in Europe generally have supported these 
goals and maintained intense exchanges with Turkey-based Kurdish activists and 
members of the main Kurdish party. Despite the recent gains, major restrictions stayed 
still in place – such as the use of languages other than Turkish in state arenas (see Casier, 
2010a) – while Kurdish social and political life in general has remained under suspicion, 
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with numerous court cases against Kurdish activists, journalists and politicians (on 
charges of separatism and/or support of a terrorist organization).  
The Flemish nationalist movement  
The Flemish nationalist movement dates back to the 19th Century, some time after the 
foundation of the Belgian state in 1830. Similarly to Turkey, where Turkish became the 
language of the state and key to social and political integration, Belgium’s independence 
(from the Netherlands) was followed by the establishment of French as the official 
language, leaving the Dutch speaking population in a position of economic and social 
subordination (Hossay, 1996; Reynebeau, 1995). Political power in Belgium was thus 
concentrated in a French speaking political and economic elite (Oosterlynck, 2007), and 
Flanders and Wallonia as ethno-linguistic regions or communities had not yet emerged 
(Murphy 1988).  
The development of the Flemish ‘nation’ was the fruit of the Flemish movement 
(Reynebeau, 1995: 119). It was thought that the nation found its expression through 
language, and in order to safeguard this, the relation between state, language and nation 
needed official recognition. The demand of Flemish nationalists was thus that nation and 
state should coincide, with language considered to enable the expression of the ‘national 
character’. Faced with the necessity of learning French if ever they wished to climb up 
the social ladder, the professionals of the lower middle classes were particularly 
attracted to the Flemish movement.  
Growing in numbers but without access to the political and economic power, it was in 
the interest of these people to find ways that would consolidate their position as a 
channel between the top and the bottom layers of society. They were people with few 
material means but significant cultural capital, of which ‘mastery’ of the common 
language was one of the most important. Dutch (or Flemish) thus came to represent the 
boundary between the powerful and the powerless, operating as a means to define and 
empower this middle group. The Flemish movement (similarly to Kurdish intellectuals 
in the Kurdish nationalist movement) concentrated on the standardization of ordinary 
language. Over time, an idea grew of the Flemish as a people who had been left behind 
economically and therefore unable to develop culturally and become ‘civilized’ – again, 
like the perception of the Kurds and the Turkish Southeast .  
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By the end of the 19th century Flemish nationalism was present in three political parties, 
and a new economic elite was developing that was sensitive to the connection made by 
the Flemish movement of the idea of the ‘backwardness’ of the nation’s language to the 
underdevelopment of the region. This was particularly pertinent given the growing 
economic disparity between the French speaking north of the country, and the Dutch 
speaking south (Hossay, 1996). The demands of the nationalist movement increased as 
regional ‘self-governance’ was demanded. When World War I came, part of the Flemish 
nationalist movement collaborated with the Germans, and another, socialist part with 
the Belgian army against Germany, expecting their participation to be rewarded by the 
recognition of their demands. Central therein was the demand to recognize the equality 
of Flanders and Wallonia. At the end of the war, however, King Albert prevented Flemish 
nationalists from entering the government and obstructed the Dutchification of the 
universities and the army. Consequently, the soldiers killed in the First World War (70% 
of them Flemish) became martyrs, and this symbol of the suffering of the Flemish a 
founding myth of the Flemish nationalist movement (Wils, 2009). Not dissimilarly, the 
Kurdish nationalist movement would also continue to remind Turkey of the fact that 
Kurdish regiments fought for liberation from the Western powers alongside Mustafa 
Kemal, who was never to deliver upon his promise of political recognition (Yeğen, 
2011).  
Following the First World War the Flemish movement became more pluralistic and 
started to attach greater importance to pacifism and internationalism. As a result, it was 
also able to attract some support from communist dissidents from within the workers 
movement of that time, providing a channel to mobilize workers against the bourgeois 
upper classes (Reynebeau, 1995). Flemish nationalism thus became integrated into a 
broader ideological movement following WWI, one that considered its enemy to be not 
only ‘Frenchness’ but also the power-complex of the bourgeoisie, capitalism, the church, 
the royal family and the Belgian state, lending a sense of aversion to the state and giving 
hopes for a radical revolution. The extreme left could consider Flemish nationalism as a 
progressive movement with a revolutionary potential, since, at that time, very little was 
expected from the state legislative (parliamentary) process. Again, the historical parallel 
with the Kurdish situation in southeast Turkey is manifest. 
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These local developments coincided with an international call by US President Wilson 
for the right of each people to self-rule with the dream of a new international order of 
‘peoples’, coexisting in a peaceful new Europe, which could serve as a surrogate for a 
Soviet-style social revolution. During the interwar period all manner of cultural, social 
and professional Flemish organizations came into being. In the 1930s, some of these 
came under the influence of social-nationalism and collaborated with the German 
occupiers in WW II, bringing the Flemish nationalist movement into great discredit in 
the decades following the war. It had revived by the late 1950s, however, when the 
Flemish economy was enjoying a period of steady growth.  
As the radical wing of the Flemish movement was marginalized because of the wartime 
collaboration, it was the moderates who would take the lead in the Flemish struggle for 
self-rule (Oosterlynck, 2007). In 1954, people from within this part of the Flemish 
movement founded the People’s Union Party (Volksunie, VU), which became the sole 
alternative to the main traditional parties (Christian-Democrat, Liberal and Socialist). 
The People’s Union addressed social and ecological problems and was able to attract 
social groups that felt excluded from the economic growth: small-holders and farm 
workers, miners and youth. Flemish nationalism became attractive to people on the left 
once more, and the party further developed the idea of federalism and regional 
autonomy.  
From 1970 to 1993, under pressure from a growing call for autonomy, the Belgian state 
would gradually evolve into a full-fledged federal state, delegating ever more power to 
the regions and thus ‘hollowing out its center’ (Hooghe, 2004). In 1977, following an 
important compromise over the future of the country’s federalization (known as 
‘Egmontpact’), the most radical wing of the People’s Union party split off, establishing 
itself in 1978 as the Flemish Bloc (Vlaams Blok, VB, changing to Flemish Concern, Vlaams 
Belang, in 2004). This new party advocated for fully-fledged Flemish independence with 
an extreme rightist agenda, The People’s Union party was to fall victim to another right-
left divide in 2002, with conservatives forming the New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-
Vlaamse Alliantie, N-VA) and the social-liberals forming Spirit. Recently the latter 
changed its name into SLP and now merged with the Green party, but the former 
continues to operate, espousing the secession of Flanders from Belgium.  
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The Flemish nationalist movement today continues to be split in terms of its nationalist 
goals, between that part which seeks consolidation of its current autonomous position 
within the borders of Belgium (SLP and Christian democrat CD&V), and that which 
demands separation (NV-A and Vlaams Belang). 
The Flemish-Kurdish nexus 
Narrating the origins of a long-lasting relationship  
In reconstructing the relationship between Flemish and Kurdish nationalists, focus falls 
first on the political personality of one of the founding fathers of the federalist idea in 
Flanders, Flemish nationalist politician Maurits Coppieters. Generally recognized as one 
of the main ideological leaders on the left of the Flemish movement, Coppieters was a 
fierce advocate of federalism and self-governance for the Flemish community in 
Belgium.  
Federalism was thought most appropriate for the democratization of society, as it was 
thought to bring governing authority closer to the citizens, who were thus enabled to 
control it. Federalism and pluralism were written into the People’s Union party program 
from 1967. Coppieters also developed a particular interest in the peace movement, for 
example contesting the nuclear arms race and the trade in weapons more generally 
(Dedeurwaerder, 2009). Situated on the left of the movement, and conscious of the 
movement’s dark past of collaboration with Nazi Germany, Coppieters was wary of 
instrumentalizing a discriminatory nationalist language, and explicitly promoted the 
pluralist character of the party (which stood in contrast with the extreme-rightist and 
racist Flemish Bloc (VB), from which all Flemish political parties have sought to distance 
themselves).  
We take up the story in 1979 when, following a decade and a half as Flemish 
representative in the Chamber and Senate, Coppieters becomes the first People’s Union 
member to be elected to the European Parliament. During his short period as an MEP, he 
draws attention to and support for the idea of a ‘Europe of peoples’, taking initiatives on 
behalf of the Basques, Bretons and Corsicans. Coppieters instigates a closer political 
cooperation between the autonomist and federalist parties in the European Parliament, 
which in June 1979 sign the European Charter of Peoples without a State 
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(Dedeurwaerder, 2009). Putting his faith in people’s nationalism as a leading principle 
that needs to be integrated and valorized in international politics, Coppieters rejects 
what he called ‘pretentious’ and ‘harmful’ ‘state nationalism’. Cooperation for European 
integration is seen as safeguarding the future of Flanders, as well as other regions and 
their peoples. Coppieters considers federalism as the means to achieve a ‘democracy of 
peoples’ and regards ethnicities, language regions and economic regions as constitutive 
elements of a Europe that would allow a ‘human-size’ democracy (De Beul & De Beul, 
2009: 162). Coppieters argues that ‘being a people’s nationalist also means being one for 
others’, thereby showing solidarity with people’s struggles for self-determination 
worldwide (ibid: 163). In the plenary of the European Parliament, he argues:  
Millions of Europeans of our Member-States are not represented here in their own 
identity. We federalists believe in a strong supranational power, if and upon the 
condition that the Member-States allow the clear distinction of regions and lend an 
identity to the peoples. Certain peoples are not only denied a proper identity but in 
some Member-States they find themselves even considered suspects (Coppieters cited 
in Vanhaelewyn, 2009).2   
The 1981 establishment of the European Free Alliance (EFA) in the European 
Parliament, which marks the beginning of a growing political space for regionalist 
politics at the European level, is considered the heritage of Coppieters and his followers’ 
dedication to the federalist dream in relation to the project of European integration (De 
Winter & Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2002). It is the inspiration and idealism of Coppieters 
that is later to find expression in the engagements of Flemish nationalist politicians with 
the Kurdish cause, both in national and international politics. And it is in this strong 
internationalism of the Flemish nationalist movement that the rationale for its 
commitment to the plight of the Kurds is embedded.  
 
The political is personal? The political mediators’ beliefs and party 
commitments  
                                                           
2 All translations from Dutch/Flemish by the author. 
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This is the core of being a nationalist: one cannot be a nationalist without being an 
inter-nationalist. And of course, the carrier of this is the respect for every people. Every 
people has a right to self-rule (Willy Kuijpers, 20 July 2009).  
During the period when the People’s Union Party emerged – the decade between the 
mid-60s and mid-70s – political parties sprung up in defense of a threatened language, 
culture or region all around Europe (Bouveroux & Huyse, 2009: 146-147). Some of these 
parties arose from a growing frustration at the enduring neglect or economic decay of 
their region, such as the Basque country and Galicia in Spain, or Scotland and Wales in 
the United Kingdom. Others, such as Spanish Catalonia or Northern Italy were no longer 
willing to share the gains they had achieved with the poorer parts of the country. A 
number of these parties would engage with violence as a means to achieve change, 
whereas others sought to attack the national state through the ballot box (Bouveroux & 
Huyse, 2009: 146). What all of these movements shared was a yearning for greater 
independence, a sense of being trapped and locked into the states of which they were 
unwilling parts (ibid, 2009).  
The People’s Union was in contact with these regionalist and nationalist parties, even 
ahead of the formalization of these contacts in the European Free Alliance. Many of the 
politicians that would later visit the Kurdish regions and develop an interest in the 
Kurdish cause had started off as youngsters by joining delegations to the Basque country 
in the 1970s. As former President of the People’s Union and Flemish Minister of Culture 
Bert Anciaux recalls:  
My involvement with the Kurds grew from my involvement with the Basques. I must 
have been 14 years old the first time I went to the Basque country [i.e. in 1973-4]. That 
was together with Willy Kuijpers. Later on I went back many times by myself. That was 
during the struggle against the dictatorship [i.e. Franco’s], when it was accessible. And, 
how shall I say, it was hard to deny that, to put it simply, 95 percent of the people in 
Basque country had a serious problem with Spain’s state-nationalism (Bert Anciaux, 23 
October 2009).  
Bart Staes, former People’s Union politician and current member for the Flemish Green 
party in the European Parliament, explains:  
There was a journal called Werkgroep Arbeid that later turned into Meervoud. In these 
journals there was coverage of minorities. I got in touch with that journal through my 
teachers at high school who were People’s Union-sympathizers [in the early/mid-
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1970s]. Later on I joined the People’s Union and got to know people like Willy Kuijpers, 
Maurits Coppieters, Karel Van Reeth and Jaak Vandemeulebroecke. The involvement 
with human rights and the rights of minorities developed from a sense of injustice  (Bart 
Staes, 3 May 2007). 
The source of inspiration for many Flemish nationalist at that time, Werkgroep Arbeid 
was the journal of the Flemish nationalist movement’s leftist wing. The international 
coverage of this journal focused attention on (local) national minority issues as well as 
on liberation movements in other parts of the world, such as those of South Africa and 
Palestine or in Central and South America. This was the period of incipient post-
colonialism, a time of great activity in local consciousness and political identity 
formation. There was a rejection of the vestiges of the old imperial system which was 
related to demands for liberation not only of but also within states, including in the 
imperialist centers themselves. Thus the sense of common cause and the affiliation of 
radically different nationalist groups with wildly diverging experiences, such as emerged 
in the Flemish/Kurdish case.  
Reviewing the position of the Flemish nationalists as it has developed over the past four 
decades, Jan Loones summarizes the commitment within the People’s Union thus: 
As people’s nationalists, within the People’s Union and currently within the New 
Flemish Alliance [N-VA], we have always paid attention to all peoples living in 
comparable circumstances and struggling for their own identity, a thing that also needs 
to result into the state structures. That is why we sympathize with other communities in 
the world that strive for the same goals. This is valid for the Kurds, Palestinians, 
Catalans, Basques, etc. Within the People’s Union this was strengthened because it was a 
party that incorporated this internationalism. We are nationalists, but we’ve always 
been democratic and open [minded] nationalists. As Luyten [former party ideologue 
and follower of Coppieters] said, “Flanders cannot turn inwards into itself” (Jan Loones, 
15 August 2009). 
Like their inspiration, Coppieters, the succeeding generation(s) of Flemish nationalist 
politicians of all persuasions, left and right, have continued to insist upon the need to 
distinguish between the ‘people’s nationalism’ they adhere to and what is defined as 
‘state nationalism’. State nationalism as the ideal of a unitary state is perceived as 
something backward and outdated that has created nothing but ill effect with its 
insistence on the credo of one nation, one culture and one language. As Kuijpers notes, 
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‘We should not deny that, just like any ideology, nationalism is at its most unacceptably 
extreme within a democracy.’ The sense of prudence is related back to a strong belief in 
federalism and the project of the European Union as an umbrella for the regions and 
guarantor of a peaceful co-existence. It is even the belief of some that it is due to the 
Flemish nationalist movement that the concept of a federalist state – as an alternative to 
the unitary state – has spread across Europe and into the Kurdish nationalist movement. 
In Kuijpers’ words, ‘We have taught those peoples the meaning of federalism.’ 
 
From encounter to institutionalization 
The engagement of Flemish politicians with the Kurdish question originated in the tense 
1960s. Willy Kuijpers – later to be elected to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives of 
the People and European Parliament – was active as a militant for the People’s Union 
party youth branch, Volksuniejongeren (VUJO) when, in 1967, he met the Kurdish 
political refugee Dr. Ismet Sheriff Vanly.  Later to become an advocate of the PKK 
struggle against the Turkish state, at that time Vanly was supporting the political 
struggle of Mollah Mustafa Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq, the KDP. Maurits 
Coppieters invited Vanly to Flanders. Recalling his first meeting with Sheriff Vanly, 
Kuijpers argues: 
We understood each other right away, as from within his philosophy Sheriff Vanly 
understood federalism and understood that it is possible for one language group to 
cooperate across the borders [as the Flemish and Dutch intellectuals and linguists did at 
the time], without being one and the same state (Willy Kuijpers, 20 July 2009).  
It was through Vanly that Kuijpers made contact with the Kurds in Iraq. After Kuijpers 
had been elected to the Belgian Parliament and as a member of the Commission for 
Foreign Affairs he made several visits to the Iraq of the Baath regime in the 1970s. 
‘When we were there and travelling through the country, we found Iraq to be some kind 
of Switzerland of the Middle East’, Kuijpers recalled, surprised to discover the presence 
of many ethnic and religious minorities living within the borders of the country. At that 
time, the Kurdish political opposition in Iraq enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union in 
the Cold War against the West and its Middle Eastern allies (i.e. Saddam Huseyin’s Baath 
regime, which was supported against Iran). In 1979, however, the Soviet support was 
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withdrawn and Kurdish political activists and intellectuals were expelled from the 
Lumumba University of Moscow, where they had been studying. A new generation of the 
Kurdish opposition living in exile in Austria turned to Kuijpers. ‘The question was 
whether I couldn’t do anything for these students,’ he explains.  
The students need for help came just at the time that the Flemish nationalist movement 
managed to secure its first government minister, Van Elslande Minister for Dutch 
Culture, a Flemish nationalist from the then Christian People’s Party (Christelijke 
Volkspartij, CVP), now the Christian Democrat & Flemish Party, (Christen-Democratisch 
en Vlaams, CD&V). The newly inaugurated minister granted twelve scholarships to the 
Kurdish students and Kuijpers – with the help of other members of the local People’s 
Union branch – was able to get the students enrolled into higher education institutions. 
A student house was set-up and which was to serve as a political secretariat for the 
Kurds in exile.  
We thought, let’s put all these scholarships together in order to get things running. 
These students will get along with one another and we can start up a secretariat. Some 
People’s Union families had put their holiday-savings together and so we could furnish 
the place. We were so confident that things would progress from that point on! 
But they did not.  Not only did the students’ educational levels appear to be far from 
sufficient in order to succeed at the enrolled courses, what was worse, the twelve were 
split over party and ideological lines and constantly fighting over the political direction 
that the Kurdish movement needed to take. Although united in the KSSE, the Kurdish 
Student Union in Europe and the dream of a secretariat for the Kurds and Kurdistan in 
the heart of Europe was short-lived.  
It was in 1978, during the existence of the KSSE, that TEKOSER (the Kurdish Workers 
and Students Association in Belgium) was set up. The name ‘TEKOSER’ was the Kurdish 
acronym for the Kurdish Workers and Student Association, and also a Kurdish word 
meaning ‘militant’. Established in Brussels, by that time the de facto capital of the (then) 
EEC as well as of Belgium, TEKOSER was initiated by Kurdish political refugees from 
Turkey. Among these were Derwich Ferho, a nineteen year-old who had arrived the 
previous year having fled the city of Midyat (in southeast Turkey) where he had been 
engaged in the Midyat Revolutionary Cultural Hearth Association (Devrimci Kultur Ocağı 
Derneği). Frustrated with the immobility of the KSSE, the internal ideological strife and 
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the KSSE orientation to Iraqi Kurdistan – disregarding, he thought, the other parts of 
Kurdistan – Ferho had sought a new group of companions.  
TEKOSER gathered a small group of seven Kurdish individuals, among whom were 
sympathizers of the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP), Socialist 
Workers' Party of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist Isci Partisi, TSİP), the Revolutionary Cultural 
Associations of the East (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Derneği, DDKD) and the Turkish pro-
Kurdish parties Liberation (Ala Rizgarî) and Freedom Path (Rîya Azadî). Ferho had 
sought cooperation amongst sympathizers and militants of different revolutionary leftist 
parties already present in Belgium, such as the Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye İşci 
Partisi, TIP), Dev Yol, Dev Sol and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party (Devrimci 
Halk Kurtuluş Partisi, DHKP). However, as Ferho recalls difficulties arose time and again 
over the Kurdish issue, with Ferho and his companions considered Kurdists and thus, as 
he recalls, ‘separatist’ and a ‘cause of division within the working class’ (Derwich Ferho, 
17 March 2010). This ideological dispute among the European Kurdish Diaspora 
reflected similar divisions inside Turkey, where the Kurdists eventually broke-away 
from the revolutionary left in order to address the particularities of the situation in the 
Southeast (see Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011).  
During the first years of TEKOSER a strong relationship developed between Derwich 
Ferho, and the People’s Union Party. Kuijpers actively supported Ferho and introduced 
him into the networks of the Flemish nationalist movement of that time. Having been 
taught Dutch by pro-Flemish teachers and being in touch with the leftist Flemish 
nationalist youth active in the journal Werkgroep Arbeid/Meervoud (see above), Ferho 
also started to actively relate the beliefs of the Kurds with those of the Flemish in 
Belgium, 
In 1989, TEKOSER became the Kurdish Institute of Brussels, in order to develop a more 
respectable image and in parallel with the in 1983 established Kurdish Institute of Paris. 
When Hugo Schiltz was elected onto the Flemish Executive (predecessor of the Flemish 
Parliament), he facilitated the necessary subsidies for the Kurdish Institute. With the 
consequent growth of the Institute attracting the attention of Flemish nationalist 
politicians, the Kurdish question gained visibility in public and political life, both in 
Flanders and in Belgium as a whole.  
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See it and believe: the mobilizing role of delegations  
Drawing from his experiences with diplomatic delegations to the Middle East, and with 
the help of Derwich Ferho and his contacts inside Turkey and the European Kurdish 
Diaspora, Kuijpers initiated several political ‘delegations’ to Turkey. As Kuijpers 
explains, ‘I’ve always believed strongly in seeing things before believing them’. By means 
of the delegations Kuijpers actively sought to convert other Flemish nationalist and non-
nationalist politicians into ‘believers’ if not ‘advocates’ of the Kurdish cause:  
We asked people to come along. People that we thought would be sensitive to this kind 
of issue. What was the result? These people saw what was happening over there and as 
a consequence the motions for resolutions in parliament that would formerly only enjoy 
the support of the People’s Union were being signed by these people (Willy Kuijpers, 20 
July 2009).  
It was not only the delegation members who were led to support parliamentary 
resolutions as they, in turn, succeeded in convincing other politicians within their own 
parties on the merits of the Kurdish cause in Turkey. Thus did political support grow in 
Belgium during the 1980s and the 1990s. Ferho describes the importance of the 
delegations thus:  
If we Kurds address the outside world and try to expose our problems, okay, yes, people 
believe it. However, if the same problem is exposed by the people actually living here, 
active within politics, academia, associational life, than it is even more credible. 
(Derwich Ferho, 17 March 2010). 
That the delegations made indelible impressions on their members is not surprising. In 
the 1980s Turkey’s politics and civil society were still suffering heavily from the 
consequence of the 1980 military coup. Hundreds of thousands political prisoners were 
incarcerated, with leftist and Kurdish activists in particular targeted. Turkey’s Kurdish 
question came to prominence as the escalating armed conflict in the Southeast led to 
increased state repression and serious human rights violations. Delegations attended 
trials of political activists and conducted fact-finding missions to assess the human 
rights violations in the region, as well as gave humanitarian assistance for the war 
refugees in the country.  
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With the Kurdish-inhabited provinces of the country under a de facto military 
occupation, the delegations sometimes faced major obstacles when leaving the city for 
the ‘war zone’. Kuijpers recalls the difficulties experienced when seeking to access the 
provinces under emergency law with the aid convoy:  
I had a serious row with Kozakcioğlu, who was the military governor of the Kurdish 
provinces. He would not allow us to enter with our trucks full of humanitarian aid. We 
were blocked for days on end. I went to see Kozakcioğlu, who knew French very well. 
He said, ‘Vous aimez les Kurds? Amenez-les! [You love the Kurds? Take them with you, 
then!].’ 
Ferho argues, ‘One need not be very theoretical, no. If you’ve had certain experiences 
once, twice, three times maybe, this makes you a different person.’ Telling, in this sense, 
are the recollections of former Christian People’s Party (CVP) MP Hugo Van Rompaey of 
his first delegation trip:  
Everything moved me there. We’ve talked with so many people. Victims of torture were 
giving testimony of their sufferings and we visited the burned villages. That is the 
problem of diplomats and many of our politicians. They haven’t got any affinity with 
what is happening on the ground. They move by plane from one capital to the next and 
never get to see the people it is really about. We talked to an eighteen year-old girl who 
had just been released from custody. It was a difficult encounter for me as I had a 
daughter at exactly the same age. Her wrists were full of scars but she wanted to talk to 
us about what had happened to her. We stood there listening, with tears in our eyes 
(Hugo Van Rompaey, 7 August 2009). 
Jan Loones, member of the Flemish nationalist People’s Union (currently N-VA) recalls 
his memories of another delegation in the late 1990s:  
When we were received in the village of Mizizah… I can still feel the hands of Derwich 
Ferho’s mother holding mine. I was drawn into the house. I was the only politician in 
the group then. What I recall very well was a little piece of paper that she put into my 
hands I’ve kept since. Later on I had the text on the paper translated. It contained all the 
names of the Ferho family that had left Turkey for Europe and should not return to 
Turkey because they were under threat. That is the cruelest thing that a mother can 
overcome when you have to tell your sons not to return because they’d be under 
serious threat. That memory will stay with me all my life and of course it was deepened 
when they faced that drama, when both Derwich Ferho’s parents were brutally 
murdered. I’ve interpellated the Flemish Parliament on that matter. (Jan Loones, 15 
August 2009). 
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The personal recollections of politicians testify to the lasting commitments that have 
often followed from participation in delegations. As Loones continues: 
The result [of taking part in the delegation] was that I left as a sympathizing observer 
and I returned as a Kurdish militant. Of course, the weapons of a member of parliament 
are asking questions, interpellations. Besides that, I’ve also tried to take the experiences 
of that delegation to the People’s Union Party and to steer not just the standpoints of 
individual party members but the party position itself. In the party’s presidency I’ve had 
a resolution voted that brought it to take a strong stand on the Kurdish issue, which was 
the party’s support for the construction of a nation [nation-state]. Later on, this party 
position evolved and we’ve come to argue that we will be supportive of whatever the 
Kurds themselves would like to achieve.  
Taking part in the delegations has a mobilizing effect on the participating politicians and 
reaffirms earlier commitments. Evidence of this is the instigation and timing of 
resolutions passed by and questions put to the Belgian Parliament regarding the plight 
of the Kurds: these were instigated primarily by delegation participants after visits to 
the region. In Christmas 1990, for example, a delegation to the Kurdish Southeast was 
initiated jointly by the Kurdish Institute of Brussels and Willy Kuijpers, and joined by the 
parliamentarians Hugo Van Rompaey (CVP), Jef Sleeckx (Socialist Party, SP) and Hugo 
Van Dienderen (AGALEV, forerunner to the Flemish Green party, Groen!). This visit was 
followed first by a parliamentary resolution from the three participating MPs in March 
1991 – ‘Concerning the problem of the Kurds and other ethnic minorities in Turkey’ – 
and then, later that same month, by a resolution from Willy Kuijpers – ‘Concerning the 
right to exist of Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the Soviet-Union’ (both resolutions were 
successful). Hugo Van Rompaey would write two more resolutions in March and July 
1993 – the first on ‘the oppression of the Kurds in Turkey’, and the second on ‘the 
advancement of the peace process and the restoration of human rights in the southeast 
of Turkey’ (again, both accepted).3 Earlier that year, in February 1993, Hugo Van 
Dienderen and Jef Sleeckx joined to formerly question the Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Willy Claes about a hunger strike of over 700 Kurds in Brussels in solidarity with 
the sufferings lived in Turkey; in June 1996, Van Dienderen interpellated the Minister of 
Interior Affairs Johan Vandelanotte a second time over hunger striking Kurds in order to 
demand what kind of actions the Belgian government would be taking with regards to 
                                                           
3 See http://www.dekamer.be  
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Turkey; and in November 1996, he interpellated the Minister of Justice, Stefaan De 
Clerck concerning raids in several Kurdish associations and the Kurdish satellite TV 
stations in Denderleeuw, condemning the Belgian authorities for acting on Turkey’s 
request (a charge denied).  
Formal questions (interpellations) and resolutions like these were regularly submitted 
to the two Chambers of the Belgian Parliament (Representatives and Senate) from the 
1980s through the 1990s and into the 2000s, mostly by delegation participants. Taken 
as a whole, they reflect not only the concerns in Brussels with events in Turkey, but also, 
as discussed below, the internal dynamics vis à vis this issue within Belgian politics and 
those of Europe; they bear also on the perception of the PKK as a terrorist organization, 
and provide a window to events in Turkey. 
When another hunger strike was launched in the spring of 1998, this time by Kurdish 
asylum seekers facing possible expulsion, Hugo Van Rompaey demonstrated his 
solidarity by joining the hunger strikers. Jef Sleeckx, meanwhile, threatened the Minister 
of Interior Affairs of his own party with blocking parliamentary decisions in which his 
vote was needed to achieve a majority if the expulsion decision were not redrawn (the 
decision was ultimately withdrawn and the Kurdish refugees stayed). And while the 
delegations were primarily organized at the level of formal Flemish politics, they also 
involved members of civil society organizations, such as unionists and human rights 
activists.  
In 1996, at a time when an increasing number of political asylum seekers were arriving 
following the increased intensity of the armed conflict, the support network originating 
from the delegations was widened with a campaign called ‘Coordination Stop the War 
against the Kurdish People’, which was signed by members of 150 associations. The 
Coordination called upon Turkey to respect human and people’s rights and to seek a 
political solution to the armed conflict, and upon Europe to cease all arms sales to 
Turkey. This campaign was later to evolve into an ‘interparliamentary working group for 
the Kurds’, meeting on a monthly basis at the premises of the Belgian Senate to discuss 
the evolution of the Turkey’s Kurdish issue and the situation of the Kurds in Kurdistan 
as a whole, and to develop different forms of political action (see Casier, 2011). Indeed, 
just as the Kurdish Institute of Brussels became the concrete embodiment of the political 
engagements of Kurdish and Flemish activists and politicians, the interparliamentary 
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working group can also be considered as an organizational outcome of the learning 
process of the activists in both movements, demonstrating the development of a more 
formalized system of transnational advocacy that continues to exist.  
Parallel to the demand made for the Turkish state to seek a political solution was a 
recognition among Flemish activists of the political fight for social justice in which the 
PKK was engaged. To this end, parliamentary questions were tabled which elicited from 
government ministers a linkage of the PKK with ‘terrorism’. In March 1998, for example, 
in response to an interpellation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Derycke by Alfons 
Borginon (People’s Party, VU-ID, a splinter group from the VU) concerning ‘the Kurdish 
problem’, the minister stated that the European authorities condemned the terrorism by 
the PKK and considered it a terrorist organization. This question and answer clearly 
exposes the primary ideological fault line within Belgian politics on this issue – with the 
Flemish nationalists aligned with the Kurdish nationalists being opposed by the Belgian 
government embodying the Belgian state, which was structurally aligned with the 
Turkish government embodying the Turkish state. The nationalists were concerned 
primarily with the socio-political problem (and its humanitarian consequences), the 
governments with state security (and violent threats posed to it).  
The development of interest as revealed by the political activity in Belgium linked to the 
parliamentary delegations may be instructive. Essentially, this can be understood as 
showing the commitment of Flemish nationalists to the Turkish Kurdish cause, the range 
of interest and actions, and how the focus of interest changed as the substantive 
concerns were framed by theory and experience. The very direct effect of personal 
commitment is evidenced by the results of the July 1991 delegation of Willy Kuijpers to 
Diyarbakir. Kuijpers was attending the funeral march for the murdered HEP politician 
Vedat Aydın, when it transformed into a protest demonstration, which was met in turn 
by heavy repression and violence by the security forces and military present. It was a 
young journalist-student in the delegation who managed to catch the event on 
videotape, which was then smuggled out of the country and broadcast in the main news 
program on Belgian national television.  
The actions undertaken by the politicians during the 90s were really quite wide ranging. 
In addition to the delegations to Turkey, parliamentary interpellations, resolutions and 
proposals for resolutions, and Coordination Stop the War campaign, there was a 
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delegation to Iraqi Kurdistan that incorporated a visit to the PKK mountain guerilla 
camp (December 2002), and there were press conferences and parliamentary calls for 
resolution proposals. These functioned as publicity and consciousness-raising events, 
both highlighting a number of specific events and giving public voice to a relatively 
radical perception of issues, such as the idea that Turkey was in the wrong and that 
direct action in support of the Kurds should be taken, for example with a call for a 
weapons embargo and a tourism boycott of Turkey (March 1994). 
In respect of the development of the Turkish Kurdish public discourse in Belgium, we 
observe an identifiable trend, with first a definition of interest, followed by a focused 
commitment, and then a pinpointing of single issues. To begin with, the concern of the 
Flemish nationalists tended to be rather general, not oriented to the specific question of 
the Kurds in Turkey. Thus the first three relevant resolutions concerned ‘the Kurds’ 
(September 1989), and  then ‘the Kurds and other ethnic minorities in Turkey’ and ‘the 
Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the Soviet Union’ (both March 1991, referred to above). 
An exclusive concentration on the Turkish situation developed thereafter, and the 
language became more engaged.  
As the spotlight focused more specifically on Turkish Kurdish issue, so did the 
vocabulary of the (primarily Flemish) Kurdish sympathizers in Belgium changed. Words 
like ‘right to exist’ (March 1991) and ‘protection’ (March 1992) became the much more 
strident ‘oppression’ (March 1993) and, at around the time when PKK military power 
was at its peak, ‘Turkish Kurdistan’ (May 1993). This latter constituted the most Kurdist 
language employed in (proposed) resolutions, insofar as it referred to the area in 
question as a part of Kurdistan, not Turkey (c.f. other phrases used, such as ‘the Kurdish 
people in Turkey’, or ‘the Southeast’).  
Finally, following general concern and then focused interest, specific issues were 
identified. These included human rights (July 1993), imprisonment of MPs (January 
1995), refugees (March 1998), and the death penalty sentence for captured PKK leader, 
Abdullah Öcalan (June 2000). The subject of the death penalty related also to the wider 
perspective of Europe, since Turkey’s maintenance of capital punishment on its statute 
book at that time was problematic for its bid for EU membership candidacy. Indeed, a 
resolution and a proposal on Turkey’s accession/candidature process for the EU were 
presented around this time (in November 2002 and December 2003). 
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From the regional politics of Flanders into the ‘Europe of the regions’  
The Flemish-Kurdish nexus that originated in the 1960s and 1970s and evolved into the 
1980s and 1990s directly affected the attention given to the Kurdish issue in the 
European Parliament. It was through Ferho’s contacts in the People’s Union that the first 
Kurdish initiatives towards the European Parliament were undertaken. In February 
1982, a total of eight different European based Kurdish organizations4 were brought 
together by Ferho in order to make a first visit to MEPs in Strasburg. They wrote a joint 
information file on ‘The Situation of the Kurds in Turkey Today’ outlining the suffering 
of the Kurds and other political activists before and after the 1980 coup and subsequent 
military government. The group demanded the abolition of torture and the death 
penalty, an independent commission for Kurdistan, that the Kurdish problem to be 
debated in the European Parliament and the United Nations, and that all economic and 
military aid to Turkey be halted (File, Strasburg, 15th February 1982). This first visit was 
accommodated by Herman Verheirstraeten, assistant to Jaak Vandemeulebroecke, in 
1980 one of the first Flemish nationalists to be elected to the newly installed executive 
European Parliament.  
In the European Parliament, the European Free Alliance group (EFA) developed out of 
the initiatives of Coppieters and gathered small regionalist and nationalist political 
parties of different member states. This became an important point of entry for the 
Turkish Kurdists. Jaak Vandemeulebroecke, follower of Coppieters, recalls how the 
Kurdish support from within the EFA faction came into being:  
I was the president of the European Free Alliance, the EFA, which declared its solidarity 
with all the peoples within Europe and to all who belonged to minorities. […] First, we 
stated that there should be solidarity within the European Union, but when I got to 
know Derwich he tried to convince me of the fact that many other peoples face the same 
difficulties and that is how he and Willy Kuijpers [by now an MEP] got me involved with 
the Kurdish problem. At that time we had just a small group of twelve parliament 
                                                           
4 Viz. the Progressive Democratic Labour Organization of Kurdistan (KKDK), Kurdish Cultural 
Organization (KOC-KAK), Federation of Kurdish Labour Organizations in West-Germany (KOMKAR), 
Kurdish People’s House (Mala Gelê Kurd), Federation of Students and Workers of Kurdistan in France 
(YXXKF), Organization of Kurdish Student Movements (AKSA), and Progressive Kurdish Student 
Association in Sweden (KXPK), along with TEKOSER. 
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members in the EU, but the advantage was that they all came from different member 
states or actually minority states within these, the Basques, the Catalans, the Occitans, 
the Bretons, and so forth. We told every one of them that there should be solidarity and 
thus that if one of us submitted a resolution everyone should sign and support it. What 
is more, everyone was responsible to, within his own member state and (national) 
minority to defend this issue. Thus the Catalans, for example, would feel compelled to 
pay attention to the Kurdish issue when arguing for their region or within Spain. And 
thus the issue also returned to the level of the member states and solidarity could 
increase within Europe. What we did was to assign everyone to find supporters for 
particular causes amongst their member states’ parliamentarians. In that way we were 
able to multiply the support for certain causes. That was our strategy (Jaak 
Vandemeulebroecke, 18 September 2009). 
These political strategies resulted in dozens of motions for resolutions that in particular 
sought to condemn Turkey for its violations of the human rights and the rights of its 
Kurdish minority from the 1980s onwards (Casier, 2011). Support for the plight of the 
Kurds, as well the concerns over Turkey’s human rights violations in general, would also 
develop within other parliamentary groups, such as the United Left/Nordic Green Left. 
The delegations, resolutions and formal submission of questions in the European and 
(sub)national parliaments along with other activities by politicians engaged with the 
(Turkish) Kurdish issue would continue to remain an important part of the 
transnational political activities in this area and leverage support for the Kurdish 
nationalist movement. Ferho evaluates these political initiatives as follows:  
If the political world here is a little more critical, well, that is not making it any easier for 
the other side [Turkey]. When we talked about the Kurds in the past, how many 
politicians were willing to listen? Now we have got many more friends in politics. 
(Derwich Ferho, 17 March 2010). 
Flemish politics has long been receptive to the Kurdish cause, but the success of this 
transnational advocacy network has depended strongly upon the personal commitments 
of individual politicians and Kurdish activists. Therefore, and notwithstanding the 
institutional developments described, the future transmission of these engagements is 
never guaranteed but in continual need of re-enactment.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has aimed to address a lacuna in the literature on transnationalism and 
Diaspora politics, the importance and role of political gatekeepers in transnational 
political activism. Research rarely engages with the gatekeepers’ viewpoints and beliefs 
underlying their commitment to ‘others’ causes’, nor paid sufficient attention to the 
‘learning processes’ that develop from the alignments and cooperative relationships 
between transnational political actors and gatekeepers in the receiving states and how 
these may account for the particular kinds of activities instigated by transnational 
political actors, as well as the institutionalization processes that might unfold. Equally 
lacking has been the insight that studies of political gatekeepers could provide into 
transnational advocacy networks.  
This genealogy of the relationship between members of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement and the Flemish nationalist movement has intended to show how various 
Belgian (and European) activities in support of the Kurds originated and developed. 
Firstly, in this case, delegations have clearly been one of the most effective activities to 
increase gatekeepers’ commitment to the Kurdish nationalist cause, as can be read from 
the activities undertaken by politicians after having participated in the visits. For these 
individuals, the political became much more personal. Secondly, the reconstruction of 
the Flemish-Kurdish nexus provides insight into the significance of ideological beliefs 
and the determining roles of committed individuals promoting these. These make 
comprehensible the ongoing support for an apparently distant cause like that of the 
(Turkish) Kurds among Flemish nationalist politicians in Flanders, and the regionalists 
and nationalist parties in the European Parliament more generally, irrespective of voter 
support. It proves that it was and is primarily the strong sense of identification and 
solidarity with the plight of the rights of peoples that was called to attention and created 
the fertile ground upon which Kurds’ transnational political activism could be built. And 
it helps to shows also how the Kurdish nationalist discourse has developed in Belgium 
(and the European Union). The extent to which the Flemish nationalist parties have also 
nurtured the dream of federalism and regional political autonomy for the Kurds within 
the Kurdish nationalist movement, as some gatekeepers would like to believe, is a 
question for future research. What is clear though is that it is importantly due to political 
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gatekeepers that Kurdish activism in Flanders was able to institutionalize, contribute to 
a European-wide axis of transnational activities, and become permanently sustained.  
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